Tim King writes POLITICO‘s Brussels Sketch.
When Ursula von der Leyen was seeking the endorsement of the European Parliament to become president of the European Commission, she promised certain legislative proposals “in my first 100 days in office.”
In doing so she was bowing to a tradition pioneered by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who declared at his inauguration as U.S. president in 1933 that “the nation asks for action and action now.” Generations of political leaders have since embraced the axiom that they must make an impact after little more than three months in power.
It’s an idea that’s wholly unsuited to the European Union. Being president of the Commission is nothing like being president of the United States, and VDL is no FDR. What a U.S. president might — with a compliant Congress — do in 100 days, a Commission president could not hope to achieve, even with a compliant Parliament. The EU simply isn’t made that way.
Von der Leyen’s Commission was always likely to need more time to get going, especially compared with the administration of her predecessor, Jean-Claude Juncker.
Martin Selmayr, the head of Juncker’s private office, was a man in a hurry, always impatient for change.
To begin with, her appointment was markedly different from his. Juncker was chosen as the center-right’s candidate for Commission president in March 2014 after a monthslong contest. He then campaigned for the job as a Spitzenkandidat in the European Parliament election of May 2014.
After months of campaigning, Juncker was able to set out a detailed program in mid-July 2014 — he launched his Commission on November with a declaration that “Europe’s challenges cannot wait.”
Martin Selmayr, the head of Juncker’s private office, was a man in a hurry, always impatient for change. From the beginning, he impressed on senior Commission staff the importance of presenting legislative proposals early in the Commission’s mandate if they were to have any chance of reaching the statute book.
Challenging circumstances
Von der Leyen, by contrast, never campaigned publicly for the Commission presidency before her nomination. She emerged as a compromise candidate only in July 2019, in the summit that carved up various European posts.
Juncker had campaigned for the job as a Spitzenkandidat in the European Parliament election of May 2014 | Kenzo Tribouillard/POOL/AFP via Getty Images
She didn’t have the lead-in time enjoyed by Juncker, or, for that matter, Roosevelt, who was chosen as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate in July 1932, elected in November, but took up office only on March 1933.
There were other circumstances that made a speedy start for von der Leyen’s Commission unlikely: notably that the EU was paralyzed by the stop-start drama of Britain’s departure. After two postponements, the question of whether Brexit would happen was settled only by the general election in December 2019.
Moreover, the EU’s seven-year budget cycle, which is out of sync with the five-year cycle of parliamentary elections and Commission mandates, fell unfortunately for von der Leyen: The budget for 2021-2027 was not agreed at a summit of EU leaders last month and the uncertainties still blight forward-planning by the EU institutions.
Further afield, the stars are similarly not aligned in von der Leyen’s favor. The success of any Commission presidency is subject to the health of relations between Paris and Berlin. The EU’s much vaunted Franco-German motor has stalled. And with German Chancellor Angela Merkel grinding the gears because of political troubles at home, French President Emmanuel Macron’s rhetoric is more likely to flood the motor than spark it back to life.
Not for the first time, Spain and Italy’s governments are fragile. Moreover, the relations between the EU’s larger and smaller states are strained — not just over the budget, but over the rule of law in Poland and Hungary, and over perceived protectionism by the likes of France and Germany.
Unhelpful precedent
The unhelpful precedent that haunts every incoming Commission president is Jacques Delors, who began his 10 years as arguably the most powerful and successful Commission president in January 1985, having spent the previous months touring the national capitals (in those days there were only 10 member countries).
The Delors Commission is undoubtedly the model that Juncker and Selmayr hoped to emulate.
He and his team sounded out the national governments about initiatives to relaunch the European Economic Community, and how to put them into practice. He lit upon completion of the internal market, because the rival ideas — monetary union, defense cooperation and institutional reform — proved too contentious. Hence the Single European Act, the deadline of 1992 and the myth of the Big Idea that should shape a Commission.
The Delors Commission is undoubtedly the model that Juncker and Selmayr hoped to emulate. Their failure to do so was not just down to less favorable economic circumstances and the greater complexity of managing a Union of 28 states; it also owed something to Juncker’s political miscalculations.
Early in their mandate, with the number of migrants arriving in Greece and Italy rising sharply, Juncker insisted on the mandatory relocation of 40,000 asylum seekers and quotas for each member country. Despite fierce resistance from the four Visegrad states, the proposal — now enlarged to 160,000 — went through at the height of the migration crisis.
The value and effectiveness of the measure are still debated, but it was not worth the political cost. The lesson for von der Leyen: More haste can sometimes result in less speed. The Commission must acknowledge when there is no consensus in the European Council.
Romano Prodi, former president of the European Commission | Marco Bertorello/AFP via Getty Images
The Prodi Commission of 2004-2009 provides another warning. The services directive proposed in 2004 was a bold but flawed attempt to accelerate the development of a single market in services. It was over-ambitious and — crucially — badly drafted.
The resulting mess fueled discontent with the EU and arguably contributed to the No votes in the referendums in the Netherlands and France on the EU’s constitutional treaty in 2005. The lesson for von der Leyen: Again, more haste can sometimes result in less speed.
The next 1,500
So is von der Leyen’s Commission doomed to stagnation and failure? Not necessarily.
A cynic might suspect that von der Leyen’s 100-day proposals were what was judged necessary to win over support from center-left and Green MEPs for her presidency. Last week, Kathleen Van Brempt, a Belgian center-left MEP, was to be found boasting to the Flemish newspaper De Standaard about the leverage that the Socialist group in Parliament had exerted on von der Leyen ahead of the vote on her candidacy.
Von der Leyen’s first 100 days in office have been beset by unwelcome distractions.
A kinder interpretation would be that von der Leyen’s 100-day promises were judiciously limited: a Green Deal to tackle climate change; a fair minimum wage; improved transparency about pay to counter gender inequality; and “legislation for a coordinated European approach on the human and ethical implications of artificial intelligence.”
Paradoxically, by promising some specific action in her first few months in office, von der Leyen may have bought herself and her team more time to prepare the various other elements of her “six headline ambitions” for her five-year mandate: “A European Green Deal; an economy that works for people; a Europe fit for the digital age; protecting our European way of life; a stronger Europe in the world; a new push for European democracy.” That wish list gives a semblance of structure to what is actually a ragbag of initiatives, many of them as yet only sketchily drafted.
Von der Leyen has put the most important proposals — the Green Deal and AI — in the hands of her most senior commissioners, Frans Timmermans and Margrethe Vestager, who are well-placed to move quickly. The minimum-wage proposal is assigned to a veteran of the EU scene: Nicolas Schmit, Luxembourg’s sometime-employment minister and before that permanent representative to the EU. The capabilities of Helena Dalli, responsible for the pay equality issue, are largely untested on the European stage.
Von der Leyen’s first 100 days in office have been beset by unwelcome distractions. Coronavirus and the turmoil on the Greek border make clear that no Commission is in control of its own agenda. What matters is how the Commission responds to circumstances, and whether it is ready to push forward its agenda when those circumstances are favorable.
Von der Leyen’s future rests not on the first 100 days but the first 1,500. Her calculation should be whether, after four years, she is in a position to seek a second term.