Max Bergmann, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, served in the State Department from 2011 to 2017. He is the author of the recent report “Embrace the EU: A New Progressive Approach for Reviving the Trans-Atlantic Alliance.”
WASHINGTON — Europe may have given up on America at just the wrong time.
After three years of hostility from U.S. President Donald Trump, many in Europe have concluded that the collapse in transatlantic relations is not an aberration but a reflection of a new normal. French President Emmanuel Macron vocally outlined this perspective in his “brain death of NATO” interview, pointing to U.S. President Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia and his general ambivalence toward Europe as indicative of a broader, structural trend in American policy.
Therefore, according to this view, even if a Democrat were to win in November, U.S policy toward Europe won’t be all that different than Trump’s.
This is entirely wrong. And such fatalism about the transatlantic relationship could leave Europe unprepared for a U.S. administration that is ready to build a new partnership.
America’s geopolitical rivals, Russia and China, are seeking to divide the Continent through a combination of political and economic influence.
A Democratic victory is a much more likely proposition than many Europeans realize. If a Democrat wins, whether that’s Bernie Sanders or, as is looking increasingly certain, Joe Biden, the new administration will immediately seek to renew the transatlantic alliance.
Every serious Democratic candidate for president has promised to rebuild and strengthen relationships with democratic allies, particularly in Europe. This is not idle campaign rhetoric.
A new Democratic administration will immediately come knocking on Europe’s door, wanting not just to make up — but, more importantly, to get to work on a long list of issues: fighting climate change; reigniting economic talks; regulating tech, social media and the financial industry; and addressing threats from Russia, Iran and China.
These are topics that are often best addressed not through the traditional channel of transatlantic cooperation — NATO — but through direct collaboration between Washington and the European Union. In other words, a Democratic president would likely embrace the EU in a way no other American administration has before.
A reengaged Washington is unlikely to be willing to settle for the status quo | Joe Raedle/Getty Images
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote served as a wake-up call to those in the American capital who care about the transatlantic relationship — and indeed the global order more broadly. Suddenly, Europe’s union is no longer a given and European stability can no longer be taken for granted.
Additionally, America’s geopolitical rivals, Russia and China, are seeking to divide the Continent through a combination of political and economic influence. While after 9/11, Washington viewed Europe as essentially geopolitically solved, it now increasingly sees it as geopolitically contested, especially with the rise of populist politics and illiberal governments. Europe, unfortunately, matters again.
So, what happens when America pivots back? When a new Democratic administration comes knocking, seeking a genuine partnership — even, potentially, a new “special relationship” with the EU — will Brussels answer the door?
Expect whiplash. A reengaged Washington is unlikely to be willing to settle for the status quo.
The EU will suddenly be asked to forge common bloc-wide approaches on thorny geopolitical issues where consensus may not exist. How will the EU react when Washington seeks to forge a common U.S.-EU approach toward China? Will a few member countries throw a wrench in the gears, blocking bold action as they have in other areas, when it comes to relations with Beijing?
Defense cooperation is another potentially critical area. For decades, the U.S. has opposed the creation of common EU-wide defense capabilities, focusing ad-nauseum on the 2 percent national defense NATO spending pledge. However, a new administration — not beholden to the U.S. defense industry (which doesn’t care that much anyway) — may decide to embrace European defense efforts and encourage the EU to get more ambitious and spend more collectively.
The optimistic among us hope a renewed American embrace of the European project will jolt the EU out of its current geopolitical stasis.
Washington may also get engaged in EU “internal matters,” taking a keen interest in issues like the EU budget. A U.S. administration wanting the EU to take bold action on climate change or counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects on the Continent would want the EU to have a larger budget so it can act.
Just as China and Russia seek to use their bilateral relationships with European states to influence and stymie EU efforts, a re-engaged Washington may use its bilateral influence to press national capitals to back bold EU efforts. America would likely take a dim view of the parochialism emanating from the EU states advocating a smaller EU budget.
Intensive American engagement will likely ruffle feathers. But this role would not be new for Washington. In the 1950s, American insistence on European integration efforts prompted West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to remark that “Americans were the best Europeans.”
The optimistic among us hope a renewed American embrace of the European project will jolt the EU out of its current geopolitical stasis. With the largest economy in the world, defense spending on par with Russia and 500 million people, the EU should be a major global player. In this sense, its pursuit of “strategic autonomy” will not be seen in Washington as the EU “decoupling” from the U.S. but the EU finally getting its act together.
But it would be foolish to ignore the real danger of Washington pivoting back to Europe and finding the EU — constantly stuck between the ambitions of its capital and the parochialism of its members — unwilling or unprepared. Americans in general are not patient. Optimism about U.S.-EU relations can quickly turn to pessimism.
If that comes to pass, Europe risks being seen as not worth the new president’s diplomatic time and energy. Macron will have been proven right, as the U.S. turns back to Asia and elsewhere, relegating Europe to an afterthought. But that will be the fault of Europe, not the U.S.