Nathalie Tocci is director of Istituto Affari Internazionali, a special adviser to European High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell, and the author of POLITICO‘s World View column.
ROME — At first glance, recent events in the Western Balkans hint at an ugly return to the past. Specifically, some have argued that the coronavirus epidemic is accelerating the region’s slip backward as a geopolitical battleground with a poor democratic track record.
This is no foregone conclusion. A more accurate reading of developments in the Western Balkans points to a post-coronavirus future in which the region grows ever closer to the European Union. But we are not there yet, and that future will only become reality if the EU moves decisively to make it happen — starting today as leaders gather virtually for an EU-Western Balkans summit in Zagreb.
To be sure, news from the region since the pandemic began does not make for happy reading. China has used the crisis to up the ante in the Western Balkans, with high-profile provisions of medical supplies.
In Serbia, President Aleksandar Vučić has instrumentalized the epidemic to blast the EU and cozy up to China. He has also postponed elections and declared a state of emergency that concentrates power in his hands.
The pandemic has revealed the fragility of Western Balkans’ state system — and the region’s need for outside partners if it is to survive.
Meanwhile, in Kosovo, a weakened President Hashim Thaçi has vied to disempower Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s democratically elected government, triggering a political crisis.
But let’s face it. These types of developments are nothing new for the Western Balkans. As in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, the coronavirus epidemic has simply revealed in an even-starker light the path some of these countries were already on.
The Western Balkans have been sliding toward authoritarianism for almost a decade now. Far from being a show of strength, these power grabs are more likely driven by necessity. In other words, they are displays of weakness. The citizens of the Western Balkans (and other autocratic countries, including Hungary) may not be as easy to control as would-be despots thought.
The risk is not that the Western Balkans will sail off to a Chinese El Dorado. It’s that the region will sink — socially, economically, democratically — under the weight of the epidemic and the realities it has exposed.
On top of the devastating socio-economic costs generated by closed borders, societal lockdowns and the indirect effects of the global depression to come, the pandemic has revealed the fragility of Western Balkans’ state system — and the region’s need for outside partners if it is to survive.
This is an opportunity the EU cannot miss.
The coronavirus redraws the geopolitical landscape. Globalization will not go away, but it will feature greater redundancies and shorter supply chains. The post-pandemic recovery will likely witness a world in which regions turn inward or toward their nearest neighbors. And, in a more regionalized world, the Western Balkans can only side with — and eventually belong to — the EU.
Fortunately, the EU has woken up once again to the region’s strategic importance. After an embarrassing blunder last fall, when EU leaders put the bloc’s enlargement policy briefly in doubt, things are back on track.
The EU has agreed to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. And ahead of the virtual summit in Zagreb, the Commission has allocated €3.3 billion to the region to address the immediate COVID-19 health and humanitarian needs, as well as its longer-term socio-economic repercussions. It has also provided the region with privileged access to EU programs, signaling both concretely and symbolically that the Western Balkans is family.
On the peace and reconciliation front, High Representative Josep Borrell in April appointed a high-caliber political figure, Miroslav Lajčák, a former Slovakian foreign minister, to revitalize the stalled Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and spur the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo.
The trick now will be to make sure that the EU’s renewed commitment to the region does not come at the expense of supporting democracy.
High Representative of the European Union Josep Borrell attends a press conference in Zagreb on March 6, 2020 | Damir Sencar/AFP via Getty Images
The new enlargement methodology drafted earlier this year by the European Commission puts the need for reforms front and center. But this has already been undermined to an extent by a Commission communication last week that points in the opposite direction, with a short section on fundamental freedoms being slapped at the end as an afterthought, and with no apparent connection with the proposals put forward.
The EU’s commitment to the Western Balkans must not be propelled by the fear that the region will otherwise fall into China’s lap. It also has to resist the knee-jerk reflex to try to please the region’s rulers no matter what.
As the EU doubles down on its commitment to the region, it will also have to double down on its insistence for reforms. This should begin with a close monitoring of the recent centralization in executive power, and be quickly followed up with recommendations for their rapid removal. Restrictions on civil rights and abuses in the handling of personal data should receive similar treatment.
The EU must also systematically ensure that the significant funds in store for the Western Balkans are conditional upon reforms.
The Western Balkans are not sailing east. They want to remain firmly in Europe. And that’s precisely why the EU must not just recommit strategically to the region, but must do so with a focus on reforms as its guiding light.