Maryia Sadouskaya-Komlach is a Belarusian journalist and program coordinator at Free Press Unlimited.
WARSAW — Poland is trying to reinstate its role as chief promoter of democracy in Belarus, but its own clash with Brussels over democratic values is undermining its message.
Warsaw was an early supporter of the democratic movement and victims of repression in Belarus. Back in the mid-2000s, it initiated a university admission program for expelled Belarusian students and founded the Belarusian-language TV channel Belsat TV. Then Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski was one of the masterminds of the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy that included Belarus. He also visited Belarus back in 2010 to negotiate a deal on democratic reforms — though that ultimately failed.
But in more recent years — since the Law and Justice party came to power in 2015 — Poland has largely opted for a good-neighbor approach to Belarus.
While the regime in Minsk continued its policy of suppressing the opposition and the media, and did little to assuage international concerns about human rights, Poland appeared to have more pragmatic concerns. At a meeting in May, Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz discussed a range of issues with his Belarusian counterpart Uladzimir Makei, from new oil deals to the future of the so-called Eastern Partnership. That list apparently did not include democratic reforms or human rights.
Just over a month after his warm-hearted greetings, Lukashenko accused Poland of running a special ops center near Warsaw in order to overthrow the Belarusian regime.
In its efforts to help Belarus achieve greater independence from Russian energy supplies, Warsaw has also ignored the fact that Belarusians protesting against Russian influence were being fined and jailed, or that journalists of Belsat TV were denied government accreditation and fined. In February, Belsat TV’s Agnieszka Romaszewska warned that the Polish government was not doing enough to build relations with Belarus’ civil society.
For Warsaw, the silent approach has clear advantages. By 2018, Belarus had become Poland’s third-biggest trade partner among former Soviet states — not least due to the re-export of Polish-sanctioned apples to Russia. And in July, Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenko was among the first to congratulate Andrzej Duda following his reelection as president, expressing “hope for further strengthening of trust- and respect-based good neighborly relations and constructive cooperation.”
That conviviality disappeared quickly after Belarus’ disputed presidential election in August.
Just over a month after his warm-hearted greetings, Lukashenko accused Poland of running a special ops center near Warsaw in order to overthrow the Belarusian regime. On August 28, Lukashenko warned Lithuania and Poland that due to their hostility “now they will be shipping them [goods] by air or trading with Russia via the Baltic and Black Sea.”
Poland has become a vocal proponent of the EU’s decisive measures against the Belarusian authorities. Polish society, whose values are still deeply rooted in the Solidarity movement that brought about the end of communism, immediately recognized the historical parallels with its own struggle against authoritarian rule. Rather than let the opposition take a lead in responding to this crisis, the government started a massive campaign aimed at becoming the voice of the EU on Belarus.
Just a day after the August election in Belarus, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki appealed to European Council President Charles Michel to hold an extraordinary summit on Belarus. He later met with the Belarusian opposition in Warsaw. And before the EU could announce its own aid package, Poland pledged €11.3 million in support for civil society in Belarus. On Wednesday, Morawiecki met exiled Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.
But Poland now faces two big new challenges. First, because of its own tussle with Brussels over the rule of law, Warsaw is now seen as a less credible proponent of democratic change in Minsk.
In 2017, the European Commission triggered Article 7 proceedings against Poland over a legal overhaul that Brussels said undermined the independence of the country’s judiciary and hence violated core EU values. And its own recent presidential election was disfigured by attacks on international media outlets and scapegoating of LGBTQ people, which intensified after Duda’s reelection.
That all makes it hard for Poland’s criticism of Belarus to stick. Polish radio RMF FM, quoting sources in Brussels, suggested that the very fact the idea for an extraordinary summit came from Warsaw had given it less traction in Brussels. It went ahead only after repeated calls from the Baltic states.
Second is the growing role of another EU neighbor, Lithuania, which has hosted many Belarusian pro-democracy initiatives in its capital Vilnius and spearheaded an all-Baltics sanctions package. Unlike Poland, Lithuania enjoys a good reputation within the EU on democracy and the rule of law. Vilnius was also much quicker to give shelter to endangered Belarusian activists, including Tikhanovskaya herself.
In an op-ed for POLITICO, Lithuania’s foreign minister, Linas Linkevičius, was blunt in his description of Lukashenko as a “former” president at the head of a “dictatorship.” Lithuania has also shown solidarity with the Belarusians in other ways, for example by mobilizing more than 50,000 citizens to join a solidarity chain from Vilnius to the Belarusian border.
After years of doing little, Poland now says it wants to help change Belarus for the better. But it is discovering that by pressing ahead with constitutional changes that deviate from EU core values, its influence beyond its borders is far less than it once was.