A case for radical French gradualism

If he makes it to the Elysée Palace, as the polls say he will in May, François Fillon won’t be the reformer everyone expects, and that’s fine.

After a spectacular last-minute surge in November, Fillon won the center-right primaries for French president by a margin of two-to-one on high turnout. Long dismissed as former President Nicolas Sarkozy’s meek prime minister, Fillon stood out in televised debates by promising to make France the most powerful economy in Europe over a decade through a series of liberal reforms.

Fillon’s victory has fueled the suggestion the French middle-class harbor a secret desire for bold reform. This is untrue. And Fillon is unlikely to prove the reformer everyone expects. Many of his boldest proposals are likely to be watered down between now and May, and indeed after.

This is no bad thing. Not only will it help Fillon beat the National Front’s Marine Le Pen, it will also help him govern and better deal with France’s security and economic challenges once elected.

The priority for next year’s election must be to beat Le Pen, who could win as much as 30 percent of the vote in the first round in April. To do this, Fillon will need the support of left-wing voters who feel safer with him than with Le Pen’s promises of “intelligent protectionism” and “national preference.”

His only option will be to dilute some of his reform proposals, as he is already doing on health care, regarding his pledge to put social security on a “stable financial footing.” Other policies are likely to follow a similar fate, allowing Fillon to prevent a Le Pen victory in May.

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Fillon’s process of moderation and adaptation is also likely to continue if he wins the presidency.

The National Front is sure to do well in the next legislative elections, roughly one month after the presidential elections, securing it close to 50-60 seats in the National Assembly. This will firmly anchor Le Pen’s political force in what will be a three-party system (the National Front currently holds just two seats).

In this more competitive political environment, it will be easier for the National Front to capitalize on voter discontent, especially if Fillon insists on advancing brutal reforms. For example, the idea that French voters will simply accept a three-year rise in the retirement age, from 62 to 65, in the space of a five-year term is completely unrealistic. Sarkozy managed to raise it from 60 to 62, but his reforms were phased in much more gradually.

Fillon’s proposals for reforming France’s infamous 35-hour work week are also too radical. Not only does he want to ban the 35-hour ceiling, he also wants to abolish maximum hours altogether, falling back on the EU limit of 48 hours. If Fillon tries this, France will be gridlocked by protests far worse than those faced by Prime Minister Alain Juppé in 1995.

A more balanced approach to reform would help Fillon address the multiple security risks that France currently faces. Fillon’s pledge to cut 500,000 public sector jobs will affect the police, the army and the education system. Yet these institutions will need all of their current resources — indeed they may even need more — if France is to keep a lid on terrorism and radicalization.

Finally, a more gradual approach to reform also makes economic sense. Fillon’s radical corporate tax cuts would clearly improve France’s competitiveness — over time. But if these measures unwind President François Hollande’s relatively good track record in bringing down the structural deficit, they could prove counter-productive, a very real problem given France’s high deficit and debt levels.

France does need reform. And Fillon is best placed to deliver it. But reform doesn’t take place in a vacuum, which is why Fillon is more likely to prove an incremental than a wholesale reformer. While this may cause some to sigh, it will be a better outcome than the alternative: a Le Pen presidency, if not next year, then in 2022.

Mujtaba Rahman is the head of Eurasia Group’s Europe practice.