Mujtaba Rahman is the head of Eurasia Group’s Europe practice. He tweets at @Mij_Europe.
Withholding her backing for Ursula von der Leyen’s second term as European Commission president, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has put a dent in their otherwise good relationship. The situation has also raised the question once more of whether Meloni’s mask is about to slip and reveal her “true” populist colors.
On that count, however, it looks like Meloni’s critics will be disappointed, as she appears more likely to continue advancing her more constructive “third-way” populism, working with Brussels and key EU capitals to advance her political priorities instead.
The Italian prime minister’s abstention in the von der Leyen vote was tactical. But the far more important — and telling — strategic decision she made was to not join the Patriots for Europe, the far right’s revamped alliance under the auspices and leadership of Hungary’s wily Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
The Greens’ decision to support von der Leyen undoubtedly made Meloni’s choice more costly, as it would have irked the Italian leader’s nationalist base and given oxygen to her far-right junior coalition partner — the League.
Meloni was also annoyed when leaders from the EU’s three centrist political parties caucused among themselves to divvy up the EU’s “top jobs” without Rome’s involvement — a political sleight of hand given her strong showing in the European elections.
But failing to back von der Leyen in the European Council and in the European Parliament — where the lawmakers of Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party voted against the Commission president in the secret ballot — was designed to signal that the Italian leader’s support shouldn’t be taken for granted. Importantly, Meloni also cushioned the blow by suggesting she’s eager to continue constructively engaging with the EU.
This all makes sense. Given her core priorities on fiscal policy, access to EU funds and migration, Meloni will benefit from remaining on good terms with Brussels. Von der Leyen also has little interest in antagonizing Meloni and pushing her closer to the far right. Plus, the current weakness of French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz — both of whom have more or less been completely engulfed by significant domestic challenges — means the Italian prime minister remains an important partner for the Commission president.
So, what are Meloni’s key priorities, and how will the EU be helpful in achieving them?
To start, negotiations over the 2025 budget are slowly coming into focus. This will be Italy’s first budget subject to the EU’s reformed fiscal rules and, like France, the country’s going to be asked to undertake a big fiscal correction, somewhere in the order of 0.5 percent of GDP.
However, if it so chooses, the Commission has the flexibility to make this process less painful for Rome, allowing it to undertake a less onerous fiscal adjustment over the course of seven years instead of four, while also accounting for the interest payments the government has to make on its outstanding debt.
Another important goal for Rome is to ensure the uninterrupted flow of EU recovery funds, which are key to Italy’s growth outlook. So far, amicable relations with the EU have helped keep the money tricking in from NextGenerationEU, the bloc’s recovery instrument. And Meloni hopes to make further progress on the renegotiation of the underlying plan, which needs to be completed by August 2026 in order to allow Italy and other countries more time to implement reforms and spend the money they receive.
Migration is another big one for Rome, and for this, EU financial and political support will be key. While Meloni has so far succeeded in keeping a lid on migrant flows, this has largely been due to the EU-brokered agreements that allowed Brussels to outsource migration management to transit countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. And continued support from the bloc will be crucial for her to manage domestic political pressure on this issue.
Finally, Meloni’s hoping to secure a hefty portfolio for her Italian nominee in the new Commission, like a senior economic post linked to the EU’s new competitiveness agenda — such as the internal market, competition or trade — and preferably a vice president position.
So, while there’s a lot of concern in Brussels and other European capitals that former U.S. President Donald Trump’s possible reelection in November could be the moment Meloni tilts further right, given the rents she wants to extract from Brussels, that remains rather unlikely.
But it’s also because the European far right no longer presents an ideal home for Meloni either. She has little interest in being subordinated to Orbán and French opposition leader Marine Le Pen’s new and larger far-right group — something that would bring her little practical benefit and greatly restrict her.
All this suggests Meloni isn’t too eager to hang her hat with the Euroskeptic far right — at least not just yet — and that she’ll continue playing to the center, keeping her options open.