How Trump’s Syria strikes play into Putin’s hand

The Russian reaction to U.S. airstrikes in Syria was a predictable show of disingenuous outrage that bordered on trolling. In comments that echoed the language Western governments use when referring to Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described the airstrike as “an aggression against a sovereign state violating the international law.” 

But the Kremlin is not making a tragedy out of being snubbed by U.S. President Donald Trump, who is often described as Putin’s admirer — even his appointee — in Western media. For Moscow, the accompanying benefits will far outweigh the loss of face.

Syrian leader Bashar Al-Assad did his Russian patron a huge disservice that bordered on betrayal when he launched a chemical attack against civilians in Idlib. It was Putin who brokered the agreement on the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, preventing then-President Barack Obama from doing what Trump did Friday morning.

It is always good news for the Kremlin when the U.S. gets bogged down in another military conflict far from its shores.

The Kremlin had widely touted that agreement as a huge diplomatic breakthrough. Assad grossly undermined the importance Putin places on that perceived victory. His punishment by the U.S. will certainly not be unwelcome in Moscow. In what sounded like a reprimand, Peskov told The Associated Press, hours before the American strike, Russia’s support for Assad was “not unconditional.”

It is always good news for the Kremlin when the U.S. gets bogged down in another military conflict far from its shores. It is especially useful to Russia’s propaganda machine. If Washington can intervene in wars on the other side of the globe, then why can’t Russia do the same in its immediate vicinity, say in Ukraine? 

Among Russians, fear of NATO’s advancement is very real. Similarly, anti-Americanism is high among radical left- and right-wing parties in many European countries. So Russia’s argument that the U.S. is overreaching, yet again, will play well with both domestic and foreign audiences.

Whatever the Americans do in Syria — and especially if they launch a ground operation — they will have to coordinate it with the Russians, who are already on the ground. The threat of direct conflict between world’s greatest nuclear powers will trump all other considerations. That fact creates new opportunities for negotiations and trade-offs with the U.S., which was the whole point of Russia’s intervention in Syria in the first place.

Meddling in the Middle East, a key region in U.S. foreign policy, was the Kremlin’s way of detracting attention from its Ukrainian quagmire. Putin rightly calculated that the U.S. would prioritize Syria at the expense of Ukraine. It even hoped the U.S. would be more inclined to compromises on issues like Crimea or sanctions imposed on Russia in response to its occupation of the peninsula and the subsequent war in eastern Ukraine. 

This is the context in which we should interpret Russia’s decision to withdraw from the air safety agreement with the U.S. Moscow is raising the stakes in the future bargain, even though it is Russian soldiers who will be subject to greater risks because of this decision.

Dragging the U.S. into another conflict in the region is a dream scenario for the Kremlin. Brinkmanship is where Putin has always excelled. He has faced far worse dilemmas than many of his Western colleagues — home-grown terrorism or the Chechen war, for example — and is far more confident. He is also way more cynical.

Trump being paraded as the Kremlin’s friend was deeply awkward for the Kremlin. The political regime in Russia is existentially dependent on the U.S. being openly hostile to it. In the aftermath of Russia’s occupation of Crimea, Putin’s approval rating soared from just over 60 percent to almost 90 percent, but support has started to evaporate since. In recent weeks, Russians have visibly warmed to the idea of street protests and opposition leader Alexei Navalny. On the eve of presidential elections in 2018, this is a big problem for the Kremlin. This conflict could be the ideal way to shore up domestic support.

Putin desperately needs an enemy in the White House, ideally a cartoonish and hapless one; someone that fits a collection of clichés that confirm common Russians’ worst perception of the American political establishment. Where Obama refused to play the hypocritical “frenemy” game — an eight-year nightmare for Putin — Trump is bound to become an ideal partner.

Russians have historically been great at rallying together in the face of an outside threat. It’s a deeply embedded social instinct that Putin has manipulated masterfully from Day One. His response to Trump’s airstrikes will be no exception.

Leonid Ragozin is a freelance journalist based in Moscow.