In the wake of Brexit and the rise of Donald Trump, the media has turned its attention to the so-called “losers of globalization,” and a fierce debate has arisen over what is driving their resentment and what mainstream parties can do to bring them back into the fold.
Much of the discussion has swirled over which recent event — the Great Recession or the European refugee crisis — has done the most to fuel the rise of right-wing populism. Is the resentment primarily economic or fundamentally cultural?
The answer, of course, is that neither event explains the phenomenon, which after all, predates them both. In 1999, the far-right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) received nearly 30 percent of the national vote. And Jean-Marie Le Pen, France’s xenophobic pioneer, made it into the run-off of the presidential election in 2002. The recent “crises” may have played a role, but they are at best catalysts, not causes.
Right-wing populism, it turns out, thrives when its leaders are able to blend both types of resentment — cultural and economic — in order to create the perception of crisis. It is only when the socio-economic frustration is linked to cultural concerns, such as immigration and integration, that right-wing populists distinguish themselves from other critics of the economy.
To be sure, few people who are optimistic about the economy support right-wing populist parties. But if the main gripe of those “left behind” was really just neoliberal globalization, then they might be just as likely to choose the left wing over the right — former Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders over Republican Donald Trump in the United States, or the Left Front over the National Front in France. After all, the radical Right criticizes alleged excesses of neoliberal globalization, but only the radical Left provides a structural critique and alternative to it.
If liberal democratic parties are going to win back voters, they will have to stop simply reacting to the analyses and solutions offered by the right-wing populists, and regain the initiative in the public debate.
The roots of support for people like Donald Trump or National Front leader Marine Le Pen lay not in objective facts regarding the economy or immigration, but in the perception of an urgent threat to their status. And while the sense of crisis is almost always amplified by populist leaders, it very often has its origins in a narrative of the mainstream media and (opposition) politicians. What most voters look for in politicians is competence and control. For decades, this was what mainstream politicians delivered. But since at least the 1990s, this has been changing.
Mainstream politicians have increasingly highlighted the limits of their ability, passing the mantel of responsibility for the most pressing problems of the day to technocrats like central bankers and judges. And they have taken to defending unpopular policies by pointing to allegedly unstoppable globalization and arguing that “There Is No Alternative” (TINA).
This approach might have worked during relatively stable and profitable times (the 1980s and 1990s), but when belts have to be tightened, it has proved far less palatable. This is the economic anxiety that populists have been able to exploit. Voters who are asked to make sacrifices — even ones that are modest — want to know that they will make a difference. If mainstream politicians throw up their hands, they will either no longer vote (exit) or look for politicians who claim that an alternative is possible (voice).
That’s why the approach adopted by most mainstream parties is likely to fail. If and when the economy improves and refugee flows diminish, supporters of right-wing populists will not credit those who sat on their hands for the turnaround. Indeed, they are more likely to credit the populists for forcing mainstream parties to adopt their views and policies.
If liberal democratic parties are going to win back voters, they will have to stop simply reacting to the analyses and solutions offered by the right-wing populists, and regain the initiative in the public debate. This will require providing more attractive and convincing ideological solutions to the problems voters perceive they are facing.
These ideological alternatives should be modern; they cannot simply hark back to the policies of the mid-20th century. And they must be realistic, rooted in the structural constraints of today. Ideally, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats will offer competing alternatives, while emphasizing the shared support for the inviolable values of liberal democracy. Only then will the so-called “losers of globalization” be made to feel like they can win again.
Cas Mudde is an associate professor at the School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia and a researcher at the Center for Research on Extremism at the University of Oslo. His most recent book is “On Extremism and Democracy in Europe,” and he is currently working on a book on politics in populist times.