The problem isn’t Putin, it’s Russia

NEW YORK — The introduction of new sanctions by the United States on Russia has sent relations between the two countries to lows not seen since the end of the Cold War.

Each side blames the other and claims to be seeking better relations, behaving as if the antagonism is just an undesirable, but passing, phase.

But while many in the U.S. blame the deterioration on Russian President Vladimir Putin, the truth is that relations between the two countries have always been rocky, and the periods of cooperation have been brief.

The U.S. doesn’t just have a Putin problem. It has a Russia problem.

The two countries have butted heads since the U.S. emerged as a great power in the late 19th century and began to compete with the Russian Empire for influence in Manchuria.

Global developments may have shifted the specifics of the rivalry, and technological advances may have increased its risks. But the areas of disagreement have stayed have constant: values, zones of influence, the principles of world order.

Even Russian interference in U.S. domestic affairs is nothing new. It was a persistent threat during the 74 years of Soviet communist rule.

Washington and Moscow must recognize that the mounting global disorder necessitates a more balanced relationship.

The times in which Washington and Moscow have worked together are limited, and never as amicable as they have traditionally been portrayed. Even the anti-Hitler grand alliance during World War II, which the Russians hold up as the epitome of cooperation, was laced with suspicion. The war was fought more in parallel than in common, and it ended with a settlement that split Europe between the two contending camps.

Hopes for more cooperative relations after the demise of the Soviet Union quickly proved illusory. Carried away by ahistorical reasoning, the U.S. believed its victory in the Cold War meant that Russia, like all other countries, had little choice but to adopt the liberal democratic free-market order that had brought prosperity and peace to the West.

Consumed by a devastating socio-economic crisis, Moscow did not so much support as acquiesce to Washington’s designs. But as the Russian economy recovered and the country’s traditional tendencies reasserted themselves under Putin, historical tensions reemerged. Those culminated in the eruption of the Ukraine crisis three years ago and the near total breakdown in relations.

The U.S. needs to start from a hard truth: Russia will not soon, if ever, become a liberal democracy that fits comfortably in Western structures.

At the same time, Russia’s large presence on the global stage is guaranteed by its geographic position in the heart of Eurasia, its nuclear arsenal and unparalleled wealth of natural resources — not to mention its increasingly capable military, world-class diplomatic corps and a creative scientific community that is adept at harnessing cutting-edge technology to national purpose, as witnessed by Russia’s prowess in cyberspace. Despite predictions of further decline, Russia will not vanish as a major player.

Washington has no choice but to deal with Russia as it is, raising the question: How to manage relations with a large, powerful country that is crucial to any enduring security arrangement in Europe but espouses alien values and competes for influence in other strategically critical regions?

Containment, reinforced by punishment through sanctions, is one option — and the current preference of the U.S. political class. But Washington cannot effectively isolate one of the world’s largest economies, especially when major rising non-Western powers, notably China and India, are not prepared to follow America’s lead.

Sanctions will ultimately disappoint — especially when Russia believes its vital interests are at stake, as in Ukraine today, and that no steps short of capitulation could lead to the lifting of sanctions given the pervasive anti-Russian animus in Washington.

A better option would be to engage with Moscow pragmatically and focus on managing the geopolitical rivalry to reduce to a minimum the risk of a full-blown conflict. The U.S. should relentlessly defend its vital interests, but be prepared to find compromises on other issues as long as they don’t jeopardize its core principles.

Russian President Vladimir Putin | Mikhail Klimentyev/AFP via Getty Images

This would entail insisting on the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, for example, but signaling the willingness to pursue alternatives to Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO, given Russia’s adamant opposition.

Likewise, the U.S. should defend the integrity of its electoral processes but be willing to discuss the limits of acceptable interference in each other’s domestic affairs, given that some degree of interference is inevitable in today’s interconnected world. Other key issues could be approached in a similar spirit.

Urgent global threats — the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, climate change and pandemic diseases — require joint action by all major powers, Russia and the U.S. included.

Washington and Moscow must recognize that the mounting global disorder necessitates a more balanced relationship that, without glossing over historical disagreements, would advance the interests of both.

Thomas Graham, managing director at Kissinger Associates, was the senior director for Russia on the U.S. National Security Council staff from 2004-2007.