I consider Dmitri Trenin not only one of the foremost Russian strategic thinkers but also a mentor and a friend. Yet his piece “Fears of World War III are overblown” (July 20) is loaded with short-cuts and omissions, which weaken an otherwise legitimate point of view.
Putting aside the disturbing optics and fallout from the Helsinki summit, Trenin’s main point is that Vladimir Putin is not interested in attacking Poland and the Baltic states. Therefore the decisions taken by NATO allies since 2014 to reinforce its eastern flank are more based on emotional, historical reactions of Poland and the Baltic states, rather than justified steps.
That line of argument omits one important reality. The deployment of NATO forces (four battalions in total) on the alliance’s eastern border would have never been sanctioned by the U.S. and the big European powers just because of the deep wounds in some allies’ psyche, as Trenin calls it. This was a thoroughly considered decision, including by cautious leaders like Angela Merkel and Barack Obama, to signal to Putin that future aggressive behavior will bear a far greater cost.
The EU-U.S. sanctions are about the same thing. Therefore, NATO’s deployment and increased exercise regime are not just about stopping a Russian attack in the Baltics or Poland — highly unlikely although not entirely impossible based on Putin’s unpredictable, aggressive behaviour — but about drawing a thick red line behind 2014.
And this brings us to a second omission by Trenin. Because Putin has well understood the meaning of the allies’ red line, he has used every possible means to bypass it and continues waging his campaign against democracies. Escalation in the Donbas, major cyberattacks in Ukraine (with consequences for Western governments and companies), targeted chemical attacks on NATO soil, and most importantly, widespread interference in Western democratic elections.
In all this there is one aggressor: Russia, and one target group: Western societies and governments, who are still looking at how best to respond to this new way of waging war.
As always, the main concern in the West is to find responses that are robust enough to discourage a repeat but that do not produce an unnecessary escalation. In the end, both the EU and the U.S. know that there are far greater challenges out there, starting with China’s imperial growth, and that it would be futile to waste too many resources engaging in endless tension with Russia, even if this might help Putin preserve his regime.
Trenin has a point that Helsinki missed the chance to bring about the first détente in the hybrid war between Russia and the West. It would have taken some clear language from the U.S. president that covert though aggressive behaviour, including during the 2016 presidential election, will not happen without incurring significant cost.
But Trenin is wrong to imply that Russia is somehow expected to capitulate. The expectation is that Russia respects basic international norms and rules. Until then, attempts at normalization, through the back-door or the wickedness of a U.S. president, is likely to continue backfiring.
Fabrice Pothier
Chief strategy officer at Rasmussen Global and senior consulting fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
Santander, Spain