LONDON — The Brexit debate has been high in emotional arguments and low on clarity. Nowhere is this more obvious than on the issue of the Irish border, where politicians are still failing to grasp what’s at stake.
Ireland has featured prominently in heated Brexit arguments. But it is mainly discussed in terms of how it will be affected by various types of Brexit — whether the U.K. crashes out of the European Union and falls back to World Trade Organization rules, or abides by the bloc’s single market rules, for example.
This is a mistake. The underlying issues affecting Ireland are about people and history, not trade rules.
Whether we leave with a deal or without, the U.K., the EU and Ireland need to take large steps to address these underlying factors. Otherwise, they will be jeopardizing the fragile peace maintained since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and doing great damage to communities on both sides of the border.
The Irish issue has so far been treated to an overly legalistic approach. The format of negotiations with the EU has sought to shoe-horn discussion about Ireland and Northern Ireland into the Withdrawal Agreement, reducing the real-life problems Brexit causes for Ireland to the legalistic protocol dubbed the “backstop.”
The real issue is not the border itself, but rather what effect a change to the border will have on communities, both in the Republic and Northern Ireland.
The main focus of this backstop — which would come into effect after the two-year transition period foreseen by the Withdrawal Agreement — is to guarantee the absence of border infrastructure. It does this by keeping Northern Ireland in the EU’s single market — meaning it will continue to follow EU regulations — while the rest of the U.K. establishes a basic customs union with the EU. It’s a complex solution that, in all likelihood, would not be fully operational in time.
Because discussions focus on the border, rather than the communities on either side, the rhetoric has been about invisible gizmos that might replace the backstop, regulatory alignment for cattle and obscure WTO provisions relating to trade in border regions. For the EU, it is a matter of “defending” the single market; for the Irish government it is an issue increasingly bound up with the domestic political situation; and for the British government, it is a distraction, the import of which seemed only to dawn late in the day.
Crucially, for all sides the backstop also has started to define the future EU-U.K. trading relationship: If Northern Ireland is to maintain the status envisaged in the Withdrawal Agreement, then the only way to avoid a major long-term rupture in the U.K. is for Britain to stay at the very least in a form of permanent customs union with the EU. This was never the intention — the U.K.’s future relationship with the EU was supposed to be set by democratic debate in the U.K., possibly in conjunction with a general election.
Looking at the Irish border issue through this lens is misguided. The real issue is not the border itself, but rather what effect a change to the border will have on communities, both in the Republic and Northern Ireland.
Cows stand beneath a sign for the diused Customs Office along the Irish border | Charles McQuillan/Getty Images
As such, the controversy over the border’s future is emblematic of a still difficult relationship between the two parts of Ireland.
For the British, peace came to Ireland when the Irish Republican Army laid down its arms and Sinn Féin took its place in the Northern Ireland Assembly. But for the people of Ireland, “peace” is a continuing process, one that rests not only on a democratic assembly but also on several core tenets.
These include the studied ambiguity about identity in Northern Ireland; the surrendering of the Republic’s claim to sovereignty over the Six Counties; the principle of no constitutional change without consent, and the apparatus of North-South and East-West cooperation — all of which are embedded in the Good Friday Agreement.
Little thought is given to the fact that ensuring the border remains “frictionless” does not guarantee good communal relations — indeed, it may exacerbate them.
For advocates of a united Ireland, an open border is the great prize to rescue from Brexit as it is seen as paving the way for their political goal. The unionist community, meanwhile, are intent on maintaining open borders and regulatory parity with the rest of the U.K. But they also worry that if the price to pay is constraints on Britain’s post-Brexit freedom, support for the union may wane as a result.
The British parliament may or may not ratify the backstop. But in the meantime, the uncertainty is causing tension in Northern Ireland. And that is too much pressure to put on a sensitive political situation.
Crucially, the U.K. and the EU must commit to maintain, no matter what, a joint peace-funding program until 2027.
To guard against the possible consequences of these pressures, all three parties — British, Irish and European — must turn their attention to the real issue in Northern Ireland: the fraying state of communal politics.
Brexit urgently needs to be made consistent with existing Good Friday Agreement obligations. To do so, the EU, Britain and Ireland should establish a new body or mechanism — chaired by a neutral figure of high standing — to consider all trade issues arising from Brexit in relation to the peace agreement, including trade across the border.
The body would identify the scope of possible solutions, building on existing cross-border cooperation between police and customs authorities, and ensure commitments made in the peace deal are upheld.
The Good Friday Agreement’s mechanisms for north-south and east-west cooperation also need to be made more prominent and ambitious. The U.K. and Ireland should consider appointing an international commission to mediate between the communities in the period following Brexit, to establish common ground and build new confidence.
Stephanie McCallion waits for customers outside her Border Cafe in Muff, Ireland | Charles McQuillan/Getty Images
It will also be crucial to restore a functioning devolved government in Belfast. This will require considerable persuasion and compromise — especially with Sinn Féin, but no less with the Democratic Unionist Party, which is propping up Theresa May’s wobbly majority in London. The British PM also urgently needs to appoint a heavyweight secretary of state for Northern Ireland, one who can command a high degree of respect across all communities.
Crucially, the U.K. and the EU must commit to maintain, no matter what, a joint peace-funding program until 2027 (it is currently only slated to run until 2020). And if Northern Ireland is to be subject to the direct effect of EU law, a solution must be found to address the democratic deficit that will arise in consequence.
Both sides need to recognize that Northern Ireland is the vulnerable child in the Brexit divorce. Whatever happens on its borders, we need to pay attention to the deeper risks Brexit carries for communities on the island. With good will, changes to the border can be kept at a minimum, whether or not there is a backstop.
David Henig, a supporter of the backstop, is U.K. director of the European Centre for International Political Economy. Daniel Moylan is a former senior adviser to former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and opposes the backstop.