WARSAW — In the race for top EU jobs, Central and Eastern Europe are sitting on the sidelines.
No politician from the region has been a contender for the presidency of the European Commission or the Eurogroup. In 2014, when parties first tested the Spitzenkandidat — or lead candidate — system, the contenders were all from Western Europe. Only Poland, thanks to its size and economic weight, has landed high-level jobs, including the European Council and Parliament presidencies.
This year, the region’s prospects look similarly gloomy. As the EU gears up for the European Parliament election it looks likely the new leadership that emerges from the post-ballot power struggle will not include a single representative from the Visegrad countries.
The process by which the EU institutions’ most influential jobs are filled is nebulous; it attempts to strike a complicated balance between party politics, geography and gender. The dynamics tend to favor larger, more influential countries, so smaller, newer members are routinely overlooked.
Take Slovakia. In December 2017, it suffered a double blow. First, it was passed over in its quest to host an EU agency. Then, the country’s finance minister, Peter Kažimír, failed in his bid to become the new leader of the Eurogroup.
It’s not just the EU that’s to blame, though. Central and Eastern Europe carry much of the responsibility.
In both cases, the prize went to a Western European country. For Slovakia, whose government has said in no uncertain terms it rejects the Euroskeptic positions of its neighbors in Hungary and Poland, these decisions were major setbacks.
It’s not just the EU that’s to blame, though. Central and Eastern Europe carry much of the responsibility.
In the past year, the region has seen unprecedented democratic backsliding and the deterioration of the rule of law. This trend has cast politicians and officials from the region in a poor light and made them less appealing contenders for powerful EU positions.
Notably, the Hungarian and Polish governments — once the eminent poster boys of the democratic transition — have taken a sharp turn toward authoritarianism.
In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán appears hellbent on undermining public trust in the EU institutions by disseminating publicly financed conspiracy theories. Operating in the gray zone between closed autocracy and liberal democracy, Orbán’s regime has curbed the independence of institutions and crippled the political opposition.
Poland has taken a similarly worrying turn: It has been condemned by Brussels for attempting to take control of its judicial system and undermine the independence of the Supreme Court. The leader of the ruling party has also blamed the EU for failing to defend traditional Christian values and echoed Orbán’s accusations that the European Commission is overstepping its mandate and undermining the will of the Hungarian and Polish people.
Similar shifts toward populist-authoritarianism are also taking place in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, albeit to a lesser extent and with a less drastic impact on national institutions.
It’s a vicious circle: With Central and Eastern Europe not represented in top EU jobs, it is easy for Orbán and others to reinforce the idea that the EU operates according to a “double standard” and doesn’t respect its newer members. At the same time, this type of rhetoric makes candidates from these countries increasingly unpalatable to those who worry Euroskeptics could undermine the EU’s work from within.
It’s not lost on anyone either that these regimes in Central and Eastern Europe — where clientelism and state corruption are still deep-rooted problems — are being sustained by generous EU funding and direct investments. This does not help spread goodwill.
Is there a glimmer of hope this year? Some contenders for the Commission top job do indeed come from the region: Czech MEP Jan Zahradil is the lead candidate for the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, and Slovenian MEP Violeta Tomič is one of two standard-bearers for the United Left.
But with the post-vote political negotiations likely to be even more complex this year — as a result of Brexit and disagreement over the Spitzenkandidat system itself — the chance either could win the top job is highly unlikely. Both candidates will easily become lost in the fray, beneath more mainstream options.
Getting representatives from the region into the EU’s most prestigious jobs will require more work.
There’s a better chance, perhaps, in the race for the European Council presidency, where geopolitics and gender seem to be on the side of Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė. Her close ties to the European People’s Party, the Parliament’s biggest political force, also mean she may be able to count on support from Berlin and her regional allies.
And in Parliament, the Polish opposition party Civic Platform may have a shot at getting one of its female veterans — Róza Thun or Danuta Hübner — elected if it does well at the ballot box.
Most likely, however, getting representatives from the region into the EU’s most prestigious jobs will require more work.
As the Brexit campaign showed, heavily funded anti-EU campaigns like Orbán’s taxpayer-funded attacks on Brussels can seriously undermine people’s attitudes toward the European project — especially when they are amplified by fake news and conspiracy theories. As long as those continue, the EU is not likely to open its doors any wider.
Edit Zgut is a Ph.D. student at the Graduate School for Social Research in Warsaw and a guest lecturer at Warsaw University’s Center for Europe.