A tale of two Slavic strongmen

KIEV, Ukarine — On the surface, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko have every reason to be bosom buddies. Both are strongmen of the Russian-speaking world, their states linked in a federal union. They have no qualms about jailing or “disappearing” their opponents, muzzling the media or talking tough to the West. Soviet revanchists at heart, both lament the demise of the powerful Soviet Union and yearn for empire. Lukashenko, in fact, was the only Belarusian deputy to vote against the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.

They’re also both bachelors who like to be seen in the company of beautiful, preferably Slavic, women. And while Lukashenko doesn’t share Putin’s penchant for bareback horseriding, he’s no couch potato either. The Belarusian is an avid skier and ice hockey player. Both Putin and Lukashenko were born in the early ’60s; Putin is older by just a year.

But don’t expect to see them high-fiving on the sidelines of a closed-door meeting anytime soon. The two men can’t stand each other.

The calculating ex-KGB Russian has dismissed his Belarusian counterpart — who was the director of a state pig farm during the Soviet era — as a treacherous buffoon. And he hasn’t forgiven Lukashenko for his refusal to fall in line with other ex-Soviet leaders and recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. (Lukashenko called it a “bad precedent” instead.)

The Belarusian has also turned down Russian requests for an air force base in Belarus and closer military cooperation, and has increasingly tilted to the West to diversify the country’s economy, which has suffered from the economic downturn in sanctions-hit Russia, its main trading partner.

Lukashenko appears to have decided to dig in his heels and rely on his authoritarian instincts.

Putin didn’t take well to Lukashenko’s decision to grant visa-free travel to Europeans and Americans. He recently reintroduced border controls between the two nations, even though they’re part of a “Union State,” and cut back on supplies of subsidized gas and oil that power the Belarusian economy — an agreement known as “gas for kisses” — thus jeopardizing the country’s fragile recovery.

As Belarus’ economy sputters, Lukashenko has faced rare street protests over his introduction of an unpopular “parasite” tax on the unemployed. Fearful of Putin using a popular uprising as a pretext for a “palace coup,” the Belarusian leader at first showed rare restraint in cracking down on the protestors. But the latest demonstrations — held on Belarusian Freedom Day, on March 25 — were met with trademark brutality. More than 500 protestors were arrested, and videos on social media showed riot police kicking and beating unarmed civilians, including pensioners.

Lukashenko appears to have decided to dig in his heels and rely on his authoritarian instincts.

Meanwhile, the Belarusian leader’s showdown with Moscow has escalated. In an emotional seven-and-a-half-hour speech during his annual press conference in Minsk in February, Lukashenko claimed the Kremlin had “Belarus by the throat” over concerns that the country “would move closer to the West.” He even threatened to give up cheap Russian gas if necessary. Lukashenko’s message to Putin was clear: I’m no lapdog and I’m willing to risk confrontation to safeguard my independence.

Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko | Sergei Gapon/AFP via Getty Images

In response, the Russian media has stepped up its propaganda against Belarus, denouncing anti-Russian sentiment in the country, likening the Belarusian leader to a “Mafia godfather” and warning of a Ukraine-style popular uprising.

With tensions on the rise between the two fraternal nations, the stakes are indeed high. Will Putin risk a Crimea-style military intervention in Belarus if his fellow strongman decides to turn to the West for good?

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What happens next will depend on the personal chemistry between the two strongmen and the narrative arc of their tumultuous relationship over the last two decades. Unlike other post-Soviet dictators — or even the former Turkmen leader “Turkmenbashi,” who erected gold statues of his likeness across his country but was deferential to the Kremlin — Lukashenko has never considered himself second fiddle to Putin.

A fellow Slav, Lukashenko has been in power since 1994, a full six years longer than Putin, and considers himself his equal. When a bare-chested Putin boasted about catching a 21-kilogram pike in one of his publicity stunts, Lukashenko one-upped him and bagged a 57-kilogram catfish. In Belarus, media headlines read, “My catfish is bigger than your pike.”

Lukashenko’s grand goal when agreeing to a supranational union of Russia and Belarus with President Boris Yeltsin in 1999 was to rule over the federal entity under a rotating presidency. He envisaged being a Soviet-style leader of the Commonwealth, thus greatly expanding his powers and international stature. Putin, however, poured cold water on the Belarusian’s dreams of imperial glory, famously remarking that Belarus was the “fly” to Russia’s “meatball,” and thus had no rights to equality in their grand union.

As Putin has refashioned himself as the ideological leader of populist movements sweeping the West, Lukashenko has remained an international pariah. Dismissed by many as “Europe’s last dictator,” he was derided for praising Hitler and for his sophomoric comment that it’s “better to be a dictator than gay.”

There’s an argument that Putin, left, copied extensively from Lukashenko’s playbook | Sergei Ilnitsky/EPA

Although he has softened his stance in recent years and has even gone so far as to praise the European Union, the Belarusian still plays the role of the Joker to Putin’s wily Batman.

It might be tempting for Putin to replace the intransigent Belarusian leader with a more pliant candidate. But he’s smart enough to understand the perils involved. The opposition in Belarus is far more pro-Western than Lukashenko, and a Kremlin “coup” might encourage the Western half of the country to secede and seek an arrangement with Europe.

Putin may also be in Lukashenko’s debt. It’s not unlikely he borrowed heavily from Lukashenko’s strongman playbook. After all, Lukashenko was rigging elections and muzzling critics long before Putin came to power in 2000. The Belarusian leader’s appeal to his citizens has been his ability to provide economic and social security in return for unquestioning loyalty, a formula Putin has also successfully copied in Russia, where the state guarantees social stability and expects obeisance from its citizens in return.

Putin’s genius lies in updating the Belarusian’s tactics for the modern era and using sophisticated propaganda, hacking and other modern tools to bolster his appeal. While Lukashenko still sports an old-school East European mustache, Putin prefers the sartorial style of Bond villains, with his trademark turtlenecks, leather jackets, expensive watches and black suit.

Whether they do indeed decide to compare notes and conspire, social unrest in Russia makes it much less likely that Putin will move against Lukashenko.

Still, for all their superficial differences and diplomatic squabbles, the two leaders are cut from the same cloth. And they both now face civil unrest fueled by an economic downturn. Putin’s promise of economic and social stability has come under threat from Western-imposed sanctions and a slump in oil prices. Though his recent crackdown on protests led by dissident politician Alexei Navalny was not as brutal as in neighboring Belarus, further unrest might tip the balance and unleash even greater violence.

It’s still possible too that the crises in their respective countries will draw the two Slavic strongmen closer. Perhaps they’ll brainstorm ways to contain the protests and avoid another Ukraine-style revolution. After all, Putin is reflexively loyal to dictators, as evinced by his unwavering support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and he might be unwilling to unseat Lukashenko during his moment of weakness.

Whether they do indeed decide to compare notes and conspire, social unrest in Russia makes it much less likely that Putin will move against Lukashenko and risk destabilizing the situation even further. In fact, he might even want the Belarusian tyrant to hang on to power by brutalizing his opponents — and make Russia look more hospitable to dissidents by comparison.

Vijai Maheshwari is a writer and entrepreneur based in Kiev, Ukraine. He spent six years in Moscow in the 1990s, and was also editor-in-chief of Russian Playboy.